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Conclusion  
It is not hard to understand why drones have an image problem, associated as they are with the US 
targeted killing and signature strike programme. But an image problem can become a policy 
problem. Therefore, it is important not to conflate different issues regarding technology and policy 
in determining whether unmanned systems are, for better or worse, changing the shape of military 
intervention.  
Much of the public debate over drones has concerned the conduct of a global counter-terrorist 
campaign, rather than a sober assessment of the effect unmanned systems could have on the 
broader manner and likelihood of intervention. Nevertheless, as this report demonstrates, a careful 
study of the US drone programme can provide some more general lessons for other militaries and 
governments considering the sort of light-footprint interventions that rely heavily on precision 
strike, whether manned or unmanned. This is of particular relevance to Europe which, as Dyson 
argues, urgently needs to develop its own precision strike capabilities to reduce its dependency on 
the US and become a credible actor in its own right. 
Are drones a threat to the civilised conduct of war? Do they lower the bar to conflict? These are two 
separate questions: one relates to the conduct of military operations, and the other to the conduct 
of foreign or national security policy more widely.  
The Conduct of Intervention 
As Weizmann and other contributors to this report highlight, it is important to determine whether 
new capabilities can satisfy the essential criteria of discrimination and proportionality. The answer 
seems to be that unmanned systems, as they exist, can indeed do so. There is no inherent 
contradiction between armed drone capability and International Humanitarian Law – a finding 
echoed by the UN Human Rights Council and the British government.1 
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This is not to dismiss glibly the controversy they have aroused. Many of the critiques of drone 
warfare2 are reasonable. The US administration argues that its targeting policy is in line with the law 
of conflict, involving a three-part test that the individual targeted must pose an imminent threat; 
capture must be too difficult; and the strike must be conducted in line with proportionality and 
discrimination.3 Aside from innocent casualties, there are two other main lines of ethical objection 
to the actual conduct of this policy. First, that by so stretching the definition of ‘imminence’ – a 
justification for acting in self-defence – the administration has essentially rendered it meaningless. 
Second, that ‘signature strikes’ depart too far from careful targeting to adhere to the lawful conduct 
of war. In the words of one journalist, the operator of a CIA drone over Pakistan ‘almost certainly 
doesn’t know for sure what he’s shooting at.’4 When targeting is based merely on suspicious 
patterns of behaviour, it is not radical to argue that the principles of necessity and discrimination are 
not satisfied, and that the justification of ‘imminence’ is contorted further. 
But these are objections to a specific use, not to the nature, of drones. Targeted killing and signature 
strikes would raise precisely the same quandaries were they undertaken by cruise missiles, manned 
aerial sorties, or special forces. An underlying problem with the CIA drone programme, in fact, is the 
secrecy in which it has been conducted. This has, perhaps unfairly, suggested a wanton disregard for 
legal constraints (although the drone programme has been exempted from the ‘Counterterrorism 
Playbook’, a set of limits for legal conduct5). A more transparent drone programme, recognising 
explicit legal limits and allowing independent consideration of compliance, is one possible solution.6 
Another suggestion is to remove operations from the CIA – which, after all, is a civilian agency 
dedicated to secretive operations – and bring them under the control of the Department of Defense, 
which is accorded privileged combatant status under the Geneva Conventions.7  
These are all, however, problems of policy – not technology. For drones permit unprecedented 
levels of persistence and observation in support of effective targeting decisions; and, as Franke 
points out in her chapter, by far the majority of military drones worldwide are unarmed and used for 
surveillance. Furthermore, effective engineering could help pilots and operators make better 
decisions under stressful circumstances, as Leveringhaus and De Greef argue in their chapter. It is 
not unreasonable to assume that, on balance, unmanned systems may provide a more effective 
means of respecting International Humanitarian Law in interventions to come. There is nothing 
about drones that necessarily violates the laws and customs of war. Policy-makers should, however, 
remain alert to the possibility that while drones remain lawful, public opinion may one day turn 
against the use of unmanned systems precisely because of policy; as the chapter on lawfulness and 
legitimacy reminds us, these two concepts are linked, but distinct. 
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The Likelihood of Intervention 
Another, more general, criticism of drones is that, by offering the absence of personal and political 
risk, they ‘lower the bar to war’.8 By inducing a ‘false faith in the efficacy and morality of armed 
attack’, unmanned systems could ‘weaken the moral presumption against the use of force’.9 
These, too, are critiques that must be taken seriously. The decision to take military action must 
always be made heavily. If the object of war is to make a better peace, then it must be waged with 
due regard not just for one’s own cost in blood and treasure, but also for that of the adversary. 
Yet it is a mistake to ascribe too much to technology as a dynamo of intervention itself. It is true that 
major Western militaries now prepare for an era of ‘light-footprint’ intervention, to be waged with 
ever-more advanced gear, borne of budget austerity and war exhaustion from the protracted 
counter-insurgencies of the post-9/11 era. But the Western record of intervention has not been 
linear. For the Libya intervention, there is the Syria non-intervention; the West intervened firmly in 
Bosnia in 1995, but only after the earlier failures resulted in the worst massacre in Europe since the 
Second World War at Srebrenica; the withdrawal from Somalia and the shameful inaction over 
Rwanda sits in the historical record alongside the determined, forceful action on Kosovo in 1998 and 
1999. Technological capabilities can shape the form of intervention, but ultimately its drivers and 
determinants are political and moral. President Sarkozy and President Cameron, for instance, 
pushed for intervention in Libya on moral grounds despite serious equipment deficiencies that 
meant reliance on American assets – and, in the case of Cameron, much against the counsel of his 
own military.10 
The US drone campaign does suggest one possible way in which drones can facilitate persistent, 
global, low-footprint campaigns – in this case, of counter-terrorism. There is something to be said for 
the fact that a persistent manned campaign of strikes over sovereign Pakistani territory in pursuit of 
Al-Qa’ida would be politically more costly than relying on drones. Other elements of the Obama 
administration’s policy are troubling. The Department of Justice White Paper on drone campaign 
targeting, based on Congressional authorisation in 2001 for the use of all necessary measures 
against Al-Qa’ida and associated forces, offers a global mandate because of either direct threat, or 
the inability of a host government to deal with groups that threaten the US.11 Some states find such 
a stance less troubling; the Chinese government reportedly ‘considered’ killing a drug lord in Burma 
wanted for the brutal murder of thirteen Chinese sailors.12 
On the other hand, we should not disregard the unique political context that permits the US drone 
programme in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan: three states with varying degrees of lawless territory; a 
historically novel, globalised terrorist threat; and, of course, the unprecedented destruction and 
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impact on the American psyche of the 9/11 attacks. There is also the matter, in Pakistan, of a 
significant deployment of American and allied troops across the border in Afghanistan, fighting an 
insurgency that finds succour in the mountainous frontier between the two states. 
And, again, care should be taken not to overemphasise the novelty of drone strikes. If long-range 
armed drones can be conceptualised as a form of unmanned ‘deep strike’, then such capability has 
long been provided by weapons like the Tomahawk and Storm Shadow cruise missiles.13 Moreover, 
not all interventions will be of the type that can rely on drones. The French-led action in Mali early in 
2013, for instance, primarily relied on rapidly deployed light armour and infantry to take ground 
from Islamist rebels, with air support as but one component of a combined arms operation. 
There is certainly the risk that widespread adoption of armed drones could provide more states with 
a politically easier means to intervene forcefully in the affairs of others – particularly as the next 
generation of unmanned combat aerial vehicles is developed to survive in defended airspace. But, 
nevertheless, it is a risk that should be held in the full political and strategic context. It is far from 
inconceivable that future interventions, in the name of the Responsibility to Protect, will be 
conducted on a basis similar to that of the Libyan operation of 2011, which demanded ‘zero risk’ to 
civilians.14 (Though, as Beswick and Minor point out in their chapter, this did not translate into ‘zero 
casualties’.) As military technology becomes more capable, the normative and legal shackles upon its 
acceptable use may also grow. In the end, the changes on each side of the equation may balance 
out. 
Matching Means to Ends 
One enduring lesson of foreign intervention is the primacy of effective strategy: that is, the matching 
of various means to the intended outcome. A warning that commonly emerges in the Waddington, 
Krishnan, and Hastings Dunn and Wolff chapters is of a failure to align tactical effect with strategic 
outcome. They do not dismiss the effectiveness of targeted killing by drones out of hand; but rather 
they speak to the tension between the two levels. 
Unintended detrimental consequences of intervention – ‘blowback’– are by no means a new 
phenomenon, nor an inherent feature of drone versus other kinds of strikes. A widespread view 
holds that drones are fuelling a political and societal backlash against the US.15 Worse, unintended 
civilian deaths may be creating new grievances, driving new recruits to join terrorist groups, and 
undermining the legitimacy of the very governments the US is trying to bolster.16 In other words, the 
covert drone programme is radical Islamism’s latest recruiting sergeant.17 
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This is contested, as is inevitable when relying on anecdotal evidence. Some data suggest that the 
effect is overblown – one analyst conducting fieldwork in Yemen found very little causation between 
drone strikes and radicalisation.18 The lack of information is a major problem for both policy-makers 
and public attempting to determine the strategic impact of any intervention, not just drone strikes. 
Here, again, the secrecy of the CIA programme is an obstacle – what data we do have on it comes 
from leaks, rather than systematic analysis.19 
A lack of data may mean that talk of blowback is misguided, or it might not. Media reports tend to 
be unreliable from regions like the FATA, particularly where weapons forensics experts – who would 
be able to determine, for instance, what kind of weapon system has caused what kind of damage – 
cannot reach these areas.20 Ultimately, the information problem means that we cannot conclude 
whether anti-Americanism or declining support for local regimes are caused by or coincident with 
drone strikes. This highlights the importance of casualty recording, outlined in this report in a slightly 
different context, but still relevant to the strategic conduct of operations.  
The Obama administration faces some tough dilemmas. It must balance the principles of justice and 
accountability with a very real terrorist threat; and reconcile the need to demonstrate a credibly 
tough security policy, with the ending of a long occupation of Afghanistan while Al-Qa’ida still 
remains active in the region and elsewhere. Nevertheless, more transparency would provide 
demonstrable oversight and accountability without sacrificing the necessary operational secrecy of 
counter-terrorism. A wise long-term vision can balance the short-term demands to disrupt and 
disable terrorist groups, with a longer-term focus to resolve the grievances that give rise to 
radicalism, and also to preclude the wider use of drones in ways that sit uneasily with the laws of 
war. 
Hitting the Target? 
The future of drones in warfare is still uncertain, to say nothing of the shape of tomorrow’s 
interventions: events have their own way of confounding previous assumptions and postures. 
Current trends indicate that drones will, however, become more numerous and more widespread. 
It may also be reasonable to assume that in the near future the primary impact of drones will be 
more tactical and operational. They may not so much shape intervention as a whole as they will 
assist on-the-ground operations, providing enhanced surveillance and on-call support. Precision 
strike will remain the vital ingredient in the conduct of Western hard-power interventions. But, as 
the UK’s recent strategies indicate,21 preventative, non-kinetic, engagement strategies with at-risk 
states are likely to be the norm. 
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Yet we cannot dismiss the possibility – and, perhaps, some early indications – that larger, more 
capable drone systems might take flight and usher other campaigns of persistent and deniable 
covert action. This will be an area to watch closely in future. 
 
